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Abstract— Single sign-on (SSO) is a new authentication mech-
anism that enables a legal user with a single credential to
be authenticated by multiple service providers in a distributed
computer network. Recently, Chang and Lee proposed a new
SSO scheme and claimed its security by providing well-organized
security arguments. In this paper, however, we demonstratively
show that their scheme is actually insecure as it fails to meet
credential privacy and soundness of authentication. Specifically,
we present two impersonation attacks. The first attack allows a
malicious service provider, who has successfully communicated
with a legal user twice, to recover the user’s credential and then
to impersonate the user to access resources and services offered
by other service providers. In another attack an outsider without
any credential may be able to enjoy network services freely by
impersonating any legal user or a nonexistent user. We identify
the flaws in their security arguments to explain why attacks are
possible against their SSO scheme. Our attacks also applies to
another SSO scheme proposed by Hsu and Chuang, which in-
spired the design of Chang-Lee scheme. Moreover, by employing
an efficient verifiable encryption of RSA signatures proposed
by Ateniese, we propose an improvement for repairing Chang-
Lee scheme. We promote the formal study of the soundness of
authentication as one open problem.
Keywords: Authentication, Single Sign-On, Security Analysis,
Information Security, Distributed Computer Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the wide spread use of distributed computer networks,
it has become common to allow users to access various
network services offered by distributed service providers [1],
[2]. Consequently, user authentication (also called user iden-
tification) [3], [4] plays a crucial role in distributed computer
networks to verify if a user is legal and can therefore be
granted access to the services requested. To avoid bogus
servers users usually need to authenticate service providers.
After mutual authentication, a session key may be negotiated
to keep the confidentiality of the data exchanged between a
user and a service provider [4], [5]. In many scenarios, the
anonymity of legal users must be protected as well [4], [6].
However, practice has shown that it is a big challenge to
design efficient and secure authentication protocols with these
security properties in complex computer network environments
[7], [8].
In 2000, Lee and Chang [4] proposed a user identification
and key distribution scheme to maintain user anonymity in
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distributed computer networks. Later, Wu and Hsu [9] pointed
out that the Lee-Chang scheme is insecure against both im-
personation attacks and identity disclosure attacks. Meanwhile,
Yang et al. [10] identified a weakness in the Wu-Hsu scheme
and proposed an improvement. In 2006, however, Mangipudi
and Katti [11] pointed out that Yang et al.’s scheme suffers
from DoS (Deniable of Service) attacks and presented a new
scheme. In 2009, Hsu and Chuang [12] showed that both Yang
et al. and the Mangipudi-Katti schemes were insecure under
identity disclosure attack, and proposed an RSA-based user
identification scheme to overcome this weakness. Recently,
authentication and privacy have been attracted a lot of atten-
tions in RFID systems [13], [14], industrial networks [8], as
well as general computer networks [15].
On the other side, it is usually not practical by asking one
user to maintain distinct pairs of identity and passwords for
different service providers, since this could increase the work-
load of both users and service providers as well as the commu-
nication overhead of networks. To tackle this problem, single
sign-on (SSO) mechanism [16] has been introduced so that
after obtaining a credential from a trusted authority for a short
period (say one day), each legal user’s authentication agent
can use this single credential to complete authentication on
behalf of the user and then access multiple service providers.
Intuitively, an SSO scheme should meet at least three basic
security requirements, i.e., unforgeability, credential privacy,
and soundness. Unforgeability demands that except the trusted
authority, even a collusion of users and service providers are
not able to forge a valid credential for a new user. Credential
privacy guarantees that colluded dishonest service providers
should not be able to fully recover a user’s credential and
then impersonate the user to log in to other service providers.
Soundness means that an unregistered user without a credential
should not be able to access the services offered by service
providers. Formal security definitions of unforgeability and
credential privacy were given in [17].
A similar concept, called generalized digital certificate
(GDC) was proposed in [18] to provide user authentication
and key agreement in wireless networks, in which a user,
who holds a digital signature of his/her GDC issued by an
authority, can authenticate him/herself to a verifier by proving
the knowledge of the signature without revealing it.
Chang and Lee [19] made a careful study of SSO mecha-
nism. Firstly, they argued that the Hsu-Chuang user identifi-
cation scheme, actually an SSO scheme, has two weaknesses:
(a) an outsider can forge a valid credential by mounting a cre-
dential forging attack since the Hsu-Chang scheme employed
naive RSA signature without using any hash function to issue
2a credential for any random identity selected by a user (In fact,
this feature inherits from [10].); and (b) Hsu-Chuang scheme
requires clock synchronization since it uses a time stamp.
Then, Chang and Lee presented an interesting RSA-based
SSO scheme, which does not rely on clock synchronization
by using a nonce instead of a time stamp. Their scheme
is suitable for mobile devices due to its high efficiency
in computation and communication. Finally, they presented
a well-organized security analysis to show that their SSO
scheme supports secure mutual authentication, session key
agreement, and user anonymity. In [17], Han et al. proposed a
generic SSO construction which relies on broadcast encryption
plus zero knowledge (ZK) proof [20] showing that the prover
knows the corresponding private key of a given public key.
So, implicitly each user is assumed to have been issued a
public key in a public key infrastructure (PKI). In the setting
of RSA cryptosystem, such a ZK proof is very inefficient due
to the complexity of interactive communications between the
prover (a user) and the verifier (a service provider). There-
fore, compared with Han et al.’s generic scheme, the Chang-
Lee scheme has several attracting features: less underlying
primitives without using broadcast encryption, high efficiency
without resort to ZK proof, and no requirement of PKI for
users. Unfortunately, as we shall discuss later this efficient
SSO scheme is not secure.
In this paper we show that the Chang-Lee scheme [19]
is actually insecure by presenting two impersonation attacks,
i.e., credential recovering attack and impersonation attack
without credentials. In the first attack, a malicious service
provider who has communicated with a legal user twice can
successfully recover the user’s credential. Then, the malicious
service provider can impersonate the user to access resources
and services provided by other service providers. The other
attack may enable an outside attacker without any valid
credential to impersonate a legal user or even a nonexistent
user to have free access to the services. These two attacks
imply that the Chang-Lee SSO scheme fails to meet credential
privacy and soundness, which are essential requirements for
SSO schemes and authentication protocols. We also identify
the flaws in their security arguments in order to explain why it
is possible to mount our attacks against their scheme. Similar
attacks can also be applied to the Hsu-Chuang scheme [12],
on which the Chang-Lee scheme is based. Finally, to avoid
these two impersonation attacks we propose an improved
SSO scheme to enhance the user authentication phase of
the Chang-Lee scheme. To this end, we employ the efficient
RSA-based verifiable encryption of signatures (VES) proposed
by Ateniese [21] to verifiably and securely encrypt a user’s
credential. In fact, Ateniese’s VES was originally introduced
to realize fair exchange. There are no similar attacks in the
setting of SSO and this is also the first time of using VES to
design an SSO scheme, to the best of our knowledge.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews Chang-Lee scheme [19]. After that, we present two
attacks against the Chang-Lee scheme in Section III, and
briefly analyze Hsu-Chuang scheme [12] in Section IV. Then,
the improved SSO scheme using VES is given in Section V.
Finally, the conclusion is given in Section VI.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
SCPC The trusted authority
Ui, Pj User and Service provider, respectively
IDi, IDj The unique identity of Ui and Pj , respectively
eX , dX The public/private RSA key pair of identity X
Si The credential of Ui created by SCPC
Sx The long term private key of SCPC
Sy The public key of SCPC
EK(M) A symmetric key encryption of plaintext M using
a key K
DK(C) A symmetric key decryption of ciphertext C using
a key K
σj(SKj ,M) The signature σj on M signed by Pj with signing
key SKj
V er(PKj ,M, σj) Verifying signature σj on M with public key PKj
h(·) A given one way hash function
|| The operation of concatenation
II. REVIEW OF CHANG-LEE SCHEME
Chang and Lee’s single sign-on scheme [19] is a remote user
authentication scheme, supporting session key establishment
and user anonymity. In their scheme, RSA cryptosystems are
used to initialize a trusted authority, called an SCPC (smart
card producing center), and service providers, denoted as Pj’s.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique is employed to
establish session keys. In the Chang-Lee scheme, each user
Ui applies a credential from the trusted authority SCPC, who
signs an RSA signature for the user’s hashed identity. After
that, Ui uses a kind of knowledge proof to show that he/she is
in possession of the valid credential without revealing his/her
identity to eavesdroppers. Actually, this is the core idea of user
authentication in their scheme and also the reason why their
scheme fails to achieve secure authentication as we shall show
shortly. On the other side, each Pj maintains its own RSA
key pair for doing server authentication. The Chang-Lee’s
SSO scheme consists of three phases: system initialization,
registration, and user identification. Table I explains notations,
and the details of Chang-Lee scheme are reviewed as follows.
A. System Initialization Phase
The trusted authority SCPC first selects two large safe
primes p and q, and then sets N = pq. After that, SCPC deter-
mines its RSA key pair (e, d) such that ed = 1 mod φ(N),
where φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1). SCPC chooses a generator
g ∈ Z∗n, where n is also a large prime number. Finally, SCPC
publishes (e, g, n,N), keeps d as a secret, and erases (p, q)
immediately once this phase has been completed.
B. Registration Phase
In this phase, each user Ui chooses a unique identity IDi
with a fixed bit-length, and sends it to SCPC. After that,
SCPC will return Ui the credential Si = (IDi||h(IDi))d
mod N , where || denotes a concatenation of two binary strings
and h(·) is a collision-resistant cryptographic one-way hash
function. Here, both IDi and Si must be transferred via a
secure channel.
3At the same time, each service provider Pj with identity
IDj should maintain its own RSA public parameters (ej , Nj)
and private key dj as does by SCPC.
C. User Identification Phase
To access the resources of service provider Pj , user Ui
needs to go through the authentication protocol specified in
Fig.1. Here, k and t are random integers chosen by Pj and
Ui respectively; n1, n2 and n3 are three random nonces; and
E(·) denotes a symmetric key encryption scheme which is
used to protect the confidentiality of user Ui’s identity IDi.
We highlight this phase as follows.
• Upon receiving a service request message m1 from user
Ui, service provider Pj generates and returns user mes-
sage m2 which is made up primarily by its RSA signature
on (Z, IDj , n1). Once this signature is validated, it
means that user Ui has authenticated service provider
Pj successfully. Here, Z = gk mod n is the temporal
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange material issued by Pj .
• After that, user Ui correspondingly generates his/her
temporal DH key exchange material w = gt mod n
and issues proof x = Sh(Kij ||w||n2)i , where Kij =
h(IDi||kij) is the derived session key and kij = Zt
mod n = wk mod n = gkt mod n is the raw key
obtained by using the DH key exchange technique.
• Proof x = Sh(Kij ||w||n2)i is used to convince Pj that
Ui does hold valid credential Si without revealing the
value of Si. Namely, after receiving message m3 ser-
vice provider Pj can confirm x’s validity by check-
ing if SIDh(Kij ||w||n2)i mod N = x
e mod N , where
SIDi = (IDi||h(IDi)). if this quality holds, it means
that user Ui has been authenticated successfully by ser-
vice provider Pj . It worth noting that proof x is designed
in a particular way so that except Pj and Ui, no one else
can verify it as both Ui’s identity IDi and the newly
established session key Kij are used to produce x. This
aims to achieve user anonymity as no eavesdropper can
learn the values of IDi and Kij .
• Finally, message m4 (i.e. h(n3)) is employed to show
that Pj has obtained message m3 correctly, which implies
the success of mutual authentication and session key
establishment.
III. ATTACKS AGAINST THE CHANG-LEE SCHEME
As can be seen from the above. It seems that the Chang-
Lee SSO scheme achieves secure mutual authentication since
server authentication is done by using traditional RSA signa-
ture issued by service provider Pj and without valid credential
Si it looks impossible for an attacker to impersonate a legal
user Ui by going through the user authentication procedure.
It can be seen from the following, however, that the Chang-
Lee scheme is actually not a secure SSO scheme because there
are two potential effective and concrete impersonation attacks.
The first attack, the ‘credential recovering attack’ compromises
the credential privacy in the Chang-Lee scheme as a malicious
service provider is able to recover the credential of a legal
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Fig. 1. User Identification Phase of Chang-Lee scheme
user. The other attack, an ‘impersonation attack without cre-
dentials’, demonstrates how an outside attacker may be able to
freely make use of resources and services offered by service
providers, since the attacker can successfully impersonate a
legal user without holding a valid credential and thus violate
the requirement of soundness for an SSO scheme. In real life,
these attacks may put both users and service providers at high
risk.
We now first describe our attacks together with the assump-
tions required, justify why these assumptions are reasonable,
and finally discuss why the security analysis and proofs given
in [19] are not enough to guarantee the security of the Chang-
Lee SSO scheme.
A. Credential Recovering Attack
Intuitively, the Chang-Lee SSO scheme seems to satisfy the
requirement of credential privacy since receiving credential
proof x = Sh2i mod N , where h2 denotes h(Kij ||w||n2),
does not allow service provider Pj to recover user Ui’s
credential Si by computing Si = xh
−1
2 mod N , where h−12
refers to h−12 mod φ(N). In fact, the difficulty of calculating
h−12 from the given (e,N, x, h2) is the exact rationale why
the RSA cryptosystem is secure, i.e, it should be intractable
for an attacker to derive the RSA private key from the public
key (and a given ciphertext). This is because here we could
treat (h2, h−12 ) as another RSA public/private key pair w.r.t
the same RSA modulus N . Moreover, directly recovering
Si from x = Sh2i mod N also looks impossible as this
seems equivalent to decrypt the RSA ciphertext x w.r.t. the
(ephemeral) public key h2.
4Nevertheless, there is a pitfall in the production of proof
x = Sh2i mod N as here the same credential Si is encrypted
multiple times under different (ephemeral) public keys h2
w.r.t. the same RSA modulus N . Consequently, under the
assumption that malicious service provider Pj has run the
Chang-Lee SSO scheme with the same user Ui twice, Pj will
be able to recover Ui’s credential Si with high probability
by using the extended Euclidean algorithm. Namely, Pj can
solve Si from two equations x = Sh2i mod N and x
′ = Sh
′
2
i
mod N . The details of the attack, which share some features
of common-modulus attacks against RSA (Page 46 of [22]),
are given as follows:
1) After successfully running Chang-Lee SSO scheme
twice with the same user Ui, malicious service provider
Pj stores all messages exchanged in these two in-
stances, denoted as (IDi, x,Kij , w, n2, · · · ) for the first
instance, and (IDi, x′,K ′ij , w
′, n′2, · · · ) for the second
instance.
2) By denoting h2 = h(Kij ||w||n2) and h′2 =
h(K ′ij ||w′||n′2), Pj first checks if h2 and h′2 are co-
prime, i.e. if gcd(h2, h′2) = 1. In the case that
gcd(h2, h
′
2) = 1, Pj then runs the extended Euclidean
algorithm (pages 290-292 of [22]) to compute two
integers a and b such that a · h2 + b · h′2 = 1 (in Z).
Finally, malicious Pj can recover Ui’s credential Si by
computing
Si = x
a · x′b mod N. (1)
Eq. (1) is justified by the following equalities:
xa · x′b mod N = (Sh2i )a · (Sh
′
2
i )
b mod N
= S
a·h2+b·h′2
i mod N
= S1i mod N
= Si.
3) If gcd(h2, h′2) 6= 1, Pj needs to run more instances
with Ui so that it can get two instances such that
gcd(h2, h
′
2) = 1.
There are a number of comments to be made regarding the
above attacks. First, it has a success rate of about 60% due
for two reasons: (a) for two randomly selected integers u and
v, the probability that gcd(u, v) = 1 holds is 6/pi2 ≈ 0.6
[23][24]; and (b) as the outputs of hash function h, h2 and
h′2 can be regarded as random numbers. This means that after
executing the Chang-Lee SSO scheme with the same user Ui
twice, malicious Pj will be able to recover Ui’s credential Si
with a probability of about 0.6. Consequently, it is easy to
see that after running the scheme with Ui a couple of times,
Pj can recover Si almost certainly. Second, it is not hard to
see that the above attack could be mounted by two or multiple
malicious service providers who collude together once they put
the values of h2 together. Finally, the attack will lead to serious
consequences since after recovering the valid credential of a
legal user, malicious Pj can impersonate this user by running
Chang-Lee SSO scheme in the same way as a legal user does
to freely make use of the services offered by other service
providers.
How could service provider Pj be malicious and then mount
the above attack? On the one hand, the Chang-Lee SSO
scheme specifies that SCPC is the trusted party (refer to
Section IV A [19]). So, this implies that service providers
are not trusted parties and that they could be malicious. By
agreeing with Yang et al. [10], when they said that “the
Wu-Hsu’s modified version cold not protect the user’s token
against a malicious service provider, ...”, [19] also implicitly
agrees that there is the potential for attacks from malicious ser-
vice providers against SSO schemes. Moreover, if all service
providers are assumed to be trusted, to identify him/herself
user Ui can simply encrypt his/her credential Si under the RSA
public key of service provider Pi. Then, Pi can easily decrypt
this ciphertext to get Ui’s credential and verify its validity by
checking if it is a correct signature issued by SCPC. In fact,
such a straightforward scheme with strong assumption is much
simpler, more efficient and has better security, at least against
this type of attack.
On the other hand, according to the security models given in
[10] and [17], malicious service providers could be attackers in
SSO schemes. In fact, this is a traditional as well as prudential
way to deal with trustworthiness, since we cannot simply
assume that beside the trusted authority SCPC, all service
providers are also trusted. The basic reason is that assuming
the existence of a trusted party is the strongest supposition
in cryptography but it is usually very costly to develop and
maintain. In particular, Han et al. [17] defined collusion im-
personation attacks as a way to capture the scenarios in which
malicious service providers may recover a user’s credential and
then impersonate the user to login to other service providers.
It is easy to see that the above credential recovery attack
is simply a special case of collusion impersonation attack
where a single malicious service provider can recover a user’s
credential.
B. Impersonation Attack Without Credentials
We now study the soundness of the Chang-Lee SSO scheme,
which seems to satisfy this security requirements as well. The
main reason is that to get valid proof x satisfying SIDh2i
mod N = xe mod N for a random hash output h2, there
seems no other way but to compute x by x = SIDh2·e
−1
i
mod N , i.e., x = (SIDdi )
h2 or x = (Si)h2 mod N . There-
fore, an attacker should not be able to log in to any service
provider if it does not have the knowledge of either SCPC’s
RSA private key d or user Ui’s credential Si.
Again, however, such a plausible discussion simply explains
the rationale of the Chang-Lee SSO scheme but cannot guar-
antee its security w.r.t. the soundness. This is also the essential
reason why the current focus of research in information
security is on formal proofs which rigorously show the security
of cryptosystems. Indeed, no one can formally prove that
without knowing either SCPC’s RSA private key d or user
Ui’s credential Si, it is unfeasible to compute a proof x that
passes through authentication, as an outside attacker is able
to get a shortcut if the SCPC’s RSA public key e is a small
integer so that e’s binary length is less than the output length
of hash function h, i.e., |e| < |h(·)|. The attack is explained
in detail as follows:
1) To impersonate legal user Ui with identity IDi for
5accessing service provider Pj , an attacker E first sends
Pj request message m1 normally, as Ui does.
2) Upon receiving message m2 from Pj , E then checks
Pj’s signature and chooses a random integer t to com-
pute (kij ,Kij , w). Before moving on to the next step,
attacker E needs to check whether h(Kij ||w||n2) is
divisible by e. If not, E has to choose another t or start
a new session to satisfy this condition.
3) As h(Kij ||w||n2) is divisible by e, let h(Kij ||w||n2) =
e · b for some integer b ∈ Z. Now, E sets x = SIDbi
mod N , where SIDi = IDi||h(IDi)
4) Finally, E can impersonate user Ui to pass the authen-
tication by sending m3 = (w, x, y) to Pj , since Pj will
notice that SIDh(Kij ||w||n2)i mod N = x
e mod N .
This is because we have: SIDh(Kij ||w||n2)i mod N =
SIDb·ei mod N = x
e mod N .
There are a number of things worth noting in regard to
the above impersonation attack without credentials. First, the
attack will succeed at a rate of about 1/e for one random
number t in a new session. The reason is that e|h(Kij ||w||n2)
holds with a probability of about 1/e, since |e| < |h(·)| and the
output of hash function h can be treated as random numbers.
Consequently, if e = 3 the above attack can succeed once by
trying about three values of t on average. Even if e is as large
as 65537(= 216 + 1), trying 65537 times to get a successful
impersonation may not be difficult for attacker E as it may
explore a machine, which can be much more powerful than
a mobile device, to do the computations needed for each try,
i.e., two modular exponentiations and two hash evaluations.
Moreover, even when timeout is introduced into the Chang-Lee
scheme it may be not a real obstacle for attacker E as it can
initialize new sessions (w.r.t. the same or different identities).
Second, in the above attack we assume that e is a small
integer and attacker E may know the value of one legal user’s
identity IDi. This is reasonable as explained below. On the
one hand, in the system initialization phase (Section IV-A) the
Chang-Lee scheme only specifies that the trusted party SCPC
needs to set its RSA key pair (e, d) but does not give any
limitation on the length of public exponent e. So, e could be
a small integer with binary length less than the output length
of hash function h, i.e., |e| < |h(·)|. Moreover, in practice
this is likely to happen because: (a) to speed up the RSA
signature verification, some security standards (e.g. PKCS #1
[25]), academic papers (e.g. [26]) and popular web sites ((e.g.
wikipedia [27])) suggest that e can be set as 3 or 65537; and
(b) as the Chang-Lee scheme is claimed to be efficient even for
mobile devices in distributed networks, using small exponent e
can provide further computational advantage for these devices
as they usually have limited resources for computation and
storage [28]. In addition, the security analysis given in [19]
neither excludes the case of small e nor relies on the concrete
procedure of setting SCPC’s RSA key pair (e, d).
On the other hand, in the Chang-Lee SSO scheme users’
identities are not as crucial as their credentials, though
the identities are transferred in ciphertext to provide user
anonymity. So, users’ identities could be known by an at-
tacker due to reasons, such as users’ negligence. At least
service providers know users’ identities. Moreover, even if
users’ identities are well protected so that attacker E cannot
impersonate registered user Ui as above, E can freely forge
an identity ID. This is possible because in the Chang-Lee
scheme, each user selects his/her identity by following only
one requirement: each identity is a string with fixed bit-length.
Therefore, even an outside attacker E can use an arbitrary
such string as an identity to mount the above attack, since the
service providers are not provided any additional mechanism
to check whether identity ID has been registered with SCPC.
This also implies that if e is a small integer, E can even
impersonate a nonexistent user to make use of the resources
and services offered by service providers.
Finally, it must be emphasized that impersonation attacks
without valid credentials seriously violate the security of SSO
schemes as it allows attacker to be successfully authenticated
without first obtaining a valid credential from the trusted
authority after registration. In other words, it means that in
an SSO scheme suffering these attacks there are alternatives
which enable passing through authentication without creden-
tials.
C. Discussion
In [19], Chang and Lee provided a well-organized security
analysis to show that their SSO scheme is secure. However,
the two impersonation attacks presented in the previous section
mean that their SSO scheme is actually not secure. So, why
is their analysis not enough to guarantee the security of their
scheme? What is the security flaw in their scheme leading
to the above attacks? And what could we learn from these
attacks to prevent similar situations in the future design of
SSO schemes? These are the topics of this section.
In [19], the security of the Chang-Lee SSO scheme has
been analyzed in three different ways: 1. BAN logic [29] was
used to show the correctness of the Chang-Lee scheme; 2.
Informal security arguments were given to demonstrate that
their scheme can resist some attacks, including impersonation
attacks. 3. A formal security proof was given to prove that their
scheme is a secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol
[30]. However, these security analyses and proofs still do not
guarantee the full security of the Chang-Lee scheme and there
are a number of reasons for this. First, as early as the 1990s
it was known that although BAN logic had been shown useful
to identify some attacks, it could approve protocols which
are actually unsound in practice because of some technical
weaknesses in the logic [31]. Moreover, in [19] the authors
did not give details to show how the BAN logic can be used
to prove that their scheme guarantees mutual authentication.
In fact, at the end of section V-A of [19], the authors claimed
to be able to: “prove that Ui and Pj are able to authenticate
each other using our protocol.” but they provided no argument
to show why each party could not be impersonated by an
attacker. Second, the authors did discuss informally why their
scheme could withstand impersonation attacks by considering
two scenarios, for example, an attacker re-uses previous nonce
n2 to forge message m3 or selects random credential Si
to compute SIDi by SIDi = Sei mod N . However, such
6informal arguments neither strongly confirm their scheme’s
security against these two concrete attacks nor exclude the
existence of other scenarios of impersonation attacks, such
as those presented in previous sections. Finally, their formal
proof about AKE only focuses on the session key security, i.e.,
an attacker with all reasonable resources is not able to know
the session key established between the two parties under
the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption (refer to
Theorem 1 in [19], not the security of mutual authentication.
According to the definitions given by Bellare and Rogaway
[30], one fundamental requirement of a secure AKE protocol
is that there be a secure mutual authentication in the first place.
From the above, we can see that it is the use of credential
proof x = Sh2i mod N which leads to the above two attacks
against the Chang-Lee SSO scheme. More specifically, x =
Sh2i mod N is a kind of knowledge proof which shows that
a prover (usually played by user Ui) knows credential Si.
However, this is not a secure proof as a malicious verifier (i.e.
service provider Pj) can recover Si and an outside attacker
may be able to get authenticated without a credential. Based
on this observation, a natural improvement on the Chang-
Lee scheme would be to replace non-interactive proof x by a
rigorous but interactive zero knowledge (ZK) proof [20] that
shows the prover’s knowledge of secret Si = SIDdi mod N
without revealing any additional information about credential
Si. In other words, using the verifiably encrypted signature
introduced in [33], user Ui can encrypt his/her credential Si
under the public key of a trusted party and verifiably convince
service provider Pj that the ciphertext does contain Si w.r.t.
Ui’s identity IDi without allowing Pj to get any additional
information about credential Si. Compared with two modular
exponentiations used for generating and verifying proof x,
however, ZK proofs for showing the possession of an RSA
signature usually require hundreds of modulo exponentiations
[32], [33] since these proofs rely on inefficient “cut and
choose” method, i.e., binary challenges.
From the two attacks presented above, we can learn that
both credential privacy and soundness are crucial for SSO
schemes. As mentioned in Section III-A, credential privacy has
been studied in Yang et. al [10] and Han et al. [17]. To the best
of our knowledge, however, there is surprisingly, no existing
research which has given a careful treatment of soundness. For
example, Han et al. [17] did not investigate soundness, though
they did carefully study how to formally define credential
forgery and recovery attacks from outsiders, users, service
providers and their potential collusion. According to the most
traditional form of authentication, a user will be authenticated
if he/she can provide a valid pair of user name and password
(i.e. credential), and soundness is obviously satisfied because a
user is not able to go through authentication without providing
a valid credential which is registered and maintained by a
server. In complex scenarios, like the Chang-Lee scheme, the
situation may be less obvious and, in fact, quite challenging.
For this reason, the problem remains an open one for future
study. The question of formally defining the soundness of
SSO/authentication schemes and rigorously proving them for
concrete solutions remains an interesting and important one.
Finally, it must be noted that the analysis above shows
only that the Chang-Lee SSO scheme fails to achieve secure
authentication, without violating its security for achieving user
anonymity and session key privacy.
IV. ATTACKS ON HSU-CHUANG SCHEME
In this section, we briefly highlight the difference between
the Chang-Lee scheme [19] and the Hsu-Chuang scheme
[12] to see why the above describe impersonation attacks
apply to this latter as well. The two schemes have similar
structures and use similar notations, but the technical details
differ. In summary, the Hsu-Chuang scheme is differs from the
Chang-Lee scheme in three ways. First, in the Hsu-Chuang
scheme user Ui’s credential Si is a naive RSA signature
signed by the trusted party SCPC, i.e., Si = IDdi mod N ,
where IDi is Ui’s identity selected by him/herself. Second,
to authenticate itself, service provider Pj sends signature u =
g
h(Z||T1||IDj)·dj
j mod Nj , where Z is the DH key material
generated by Pj , T1 is the current timestamp, and IDj is
Pj’s identity. Finally, for user authentication user Ui issues
and sends proof x = Sh(Kij ||Z||w||T2)i mod N to Pj , who
validates x by checking if IDh(Kij ||Z||w||T2)i = x
e mod N .
For more detail, see [12] or Section II of [19].
As pointed out in [19], the Hsu-Chuang scheme is vul-
nerable to impersonation attack as an attacker can forge a
valid credential Si w.r.t. identity IDi by simply selecting
random Si ∈ Z∗N and then computing IDi = Sei mod N .
This attack can be excluded if a specific encoding format is
required for identities and the credential is issued by using
a secure hash h, i.e., Si = h(IDi)d mod N , as in the
Chang-Lee scheme. According to the discussion in Section
III, the Hsu-Chuang scheme is still not secure even with such
a countermeasure. The reason is that our two attacks against
the Chang-Lee scheme apply to the Hsu-Chuang scheme as
well. This means that the Hsu-Chuang scheme also fails to
satisfy both credential privacy and soundness of authentica-
tion. In addition, there is another flaw in the Hsu-Chuang
scheme. Attacker E can impersonate service provider Pj to
cheat legal users, as service authentication is conducted by
using a non-traditional RSA signature, u = gh(Z||T1||IDj)·djj
mod Nj . By communicating with Pj twice attacker E can
get messages (Z, T1, IDj , u) and (Z ′, T ′1, IDj , u
′) satisfying
u = g
h(Z||T1||IDj)·dj
j mod Nj and u
′ = gh(Z
′||T ′1||IDj)·dj
j
mod Nj . Once gcd(h(Z||T1||IDj), h(Z ′||T ′1||IDj)) = 1 (this
holds with probability about 0.6, as we discussed in Section
III-A), E can run the extended Euclidean algorithm (pages
290-292 of [22]) to find two integers a and b such that
a · h(Z||T1||IDj) + b · h(Z ′||T ′1||IDj) = 1 in Z (without
knowing the factors of Sj’s RSA modulus). Hence, E can
recover gdjj mod Nj by computing g
dj
j mod Nj = u
au′b
mod Nj . After that, E can impersonate Pj to any legal user
by using the value of gdjj mod Nj to issue signature u = (g
dj
j
mod Nj)
h(Z||T1||IDj), without knowing Pj’s RSA private key
dj .
V. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENT
To overcome the flaws in the Chang-Lee scheme [19], we
now propose an improvement by employing an RSA-based
7verifiable encryption of signatures (RSA-VES), which is an
efficient primitive introduced in [21] for realising fair exchange
of RSA signatures. VES comprises three parties: a trusted
party and two users, say Alice and Bob. The basic idea of
VES is that Alice who has a key pair of signature scheme
signs a given message and encrypts the resulting signature
under the trusted party’s public key, and uses a noninteractive
zero-knowledge (NZK) proof [35] to convince Bob that she
has signed the message and the trusted party can recover the
signature from the ciphertext. After validating the proof, Bob
can send his signature for the same message to Alice. For the
purpose of fair exchange, Alice should send her signature in
plaintext back to Bob after accepting Bob’s signature. If she
refuses to do so, however, Bob can get her signature from the
trusted party by providing Alice’s encrypted signature and his
own signature, so that the trusted party can recover Alice’s
signature and sends it to Bob, meanwhile, forwards Bob’s
signature to Alice. Thus, fair exchange is achieved.
The basic idea of the improved scheme can be highlighted
as follows. User Ui’s credential is Si = h(IDi)2d mod N ,
i.e., SCPC’s RSA signature on the square of the hashed user
identity (in contrast to Si = h(IDi)d mod N in [19]). For
user authentication, Ui will encrypt his/her credential Si using
ElGamal encryption of SCPC’s other public key y = gu by
computing P1 = Si ·yr mod N and P2 = gr mod N , where
g ∈ Z∗N of big order and u is SCPC’s secret decryption key.
In this improvement, SCPC also plays the role of the trust
authority in VES. To convince a service provider that (P1, P2)
does encrypt his/her credential Si (i.e. SCPC’s RSA signature
for IDi), Ui must also provide an NZK proof x to show that
he or she knows a secret r such that P
e
1
h(IDi)2
= (ye)r mod N
and P2 = gr mod N . Such a proof x, is called ‘proving the
equality of two discrete logarithms in a group of unknown
order’ [21], will convince the service provider without leaking
any useful information about Ui’s credential Si. For server
authentication, service providers can simply issue signatures as
did [19], though the proposed changes give service providers
the freedom to employ any secure signature scheme. The other
procedures are the same as in the Chang-Lee scheme.
A. Initialization Phase
SCPC selects two large safe primes p and q to set N = pq.
Namely, there are two primes p′ and q′ such that p = 2p′ +1
and q = 2q′ + 1. SCPC now sets its RSA public/private
key pair (e, d) such that ed ≡ 1 mod 2p′q′, where e is a
prime. Let QN be the subgroup of squares in Z∗N whose
order #G = p′q′ is unknown to the public but its bit-
length lG = |N | − 2 is publicly known. SCPC randomly
picks generator g of QN , selects an ElGamal decryption
key u, and computes the corresponding public key y = gu
mod N . In addition, for completing the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange SCPC chooses generator g ∈ Z∗N , where n is another
large prime number. SCPC also chooses a cryptographic hash
function h(·) : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, where security parameter
k satisfies 160 ≤ k ≤ |N | − 1. Another security parameter
 > 1 is chosen to control the tightness of the ZK proof [34].
Finally, SCPC publishes (e,N, h(·), , g, y, g, n), and keeps
(d, u) secret.
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Fig. 2. Our improved scheme
B. Registration Phase
In this phase, upon receiving a register request, SCPC gives
Ui fixed-length unique identity IDi and issues credential Si =
h(IDi)
2d mod N . Si calculated as SCPC’s RSA signature on
h(IDi)
2 is an element of QN , which will be the main group
we are calculating.
As in [19], each service provider Pj with identity IDj
should maintain a pair of signing/verifying keys for a secure
signature scheme (not necessarily RSA). σj(SKj ,Msg) de-
notes the signature σj on message Msg signed by Pj using
signing key SKj . V er(PKj ,Msg, σj) denotes verifying of
signature σj with public key PKj , which outputs “1” or ”0”
to indicating if the signature is valid or invalid, respectively.
C. Authentication Phase
In this phase, RSA-VES is employed to authenticate a
user, while a normal signature is used for service provider
authentication. The details are illustrated in Fig. 2 and further
explained as follows:
1) Ui sends a service request with nonce n1 to service
provider Pj .
2) Upon receiving (Req, n1), Pj calculates its session key
material Z = gk mod n where k ∈ Z∗n is a random
number, sets u = Z||IDj ||n1, issues a signature v =
σj(SKj , u), and then sends m2 = (Z, v, n2) to the user,
where n2 is a nonce selected by Pj .
83) Upon receiving m2 = (Z, v, n2), Ui sets
u = Z||IDj ||n1. Ui terminates the conversation
if V er(PKj , u, v) = 0. Otherwise, Ui accepts service
provider Pj because the signature v is valid. In this
case, Ui selects a random number t ∈ Z∗n to compute
w = gt mod n, kij = Zt mod n, and the session
key Kij = h(IDj ||kij). For user authentication, Ui
first encrypts his/her credential Si as (P1 = Si · yr
mod N,P2 = g
r mod N ), where r is a random
integer with binary length lG. Next, Ui computes
two commitments a = (ye)r1 mod N and b = gr1
mod N , where r1 ∈ ±{0, 1}(lG+k) is also a random
number. After that, Ui computes the evidence showing
that credential Si has been encrypted in (P1, P2)
under public key y. For this purpose, Ui calculates
c = h(Kij ||w||n2||yer||P2||ye||g||a||b) and s = r1−c·r
(in Z). Then, x = (P1, P2, a, b, c, s) is the NIZK proof
for user authentication. In fact, it is precisely, the
processes of generating x which is the proof part of
RSA-VES [21]. Finally, Ui encrypts his/her identity
IDi, new nonce n3, and Pj’s nonce n2 using session
key Kij to get ciphertext CT = EKij (IDi||n3||n2),
and thereafter sends m3 = (w, x,CT ) to service
provider Pj .
4) To verify Ui, Pj calculates kij = wk mod n, the
session key Kij = h(IDj ||kij), and then uses Kij
to decrypt CT and recover (IDi, n3, n2). Then, Pj
computes yer = P e1 /h(IDi)
2 mod N , a = (ye)s ·
(yer)c mod N , b = gs · P c2 mod N , and checks
if (c, s) ∈ {0, 1}k × ±{0, 1}(lG+k)+1 and c =
h(Kij ||w||n2||yer||P2||ye||g||a||b). If the output is neg-
ative, Pj aborts the conversation. Otherwise, Pj accepts
Ui and believes that they have shared the same session
key Kij by sending Ui m4 = (V ) where V = h(n3).
5) After Ui receives V , he checks if V = h(n3). If
this is true, then Ui believes that they have shared the
same session key Kij . Otherwise, Ui terminates the
conversation.
D. Security Analysis
We now analyze the security of the improved SSO scheme
by focusing on the security of the user authentication part,
especially soundness and credential privacy due to two rea-
sons. On the one hand, the unforgeability of the credential is
guaranteed by the unforgeability of RSA signatures, and the
security of service provider authentication is ensured by the
unforgeability of the secure signature scheme chosen by each
service provider. On the other hand, other security properties
(e.g., user anonymity and session key privacy) are preserved,
since these properties have been formally proved in [19] and
the corresponding parts of the Chang-Lee scheme are kept
unchanged.
Soundness requires that without holding valid credential S∗
corresponding to a target user U∗, an attacker, who could be
a collusion of users and service providers, has at most a neg-
ligible probability of generating proof x∗ and going through
user authentication by impersonating user U∗. The soundness
of the above improved SSO scheme relies on the soundness
of the NIZK proof, which also guarantees the soundness of
RSA-VES, defined as the second property of Definition 1 in
[21]. Namely, if the user authentication part is not sound,
i.e., an attacker can present valid proof x∗ without holding
the corresponding credential S∗ in non-negligible probability,
then this implies the NIZK proof of proving equality of two
discrete logarithms in a group of unknown order is not sound,
contradictory to the analysis given in Section 3.7 of [21].
Credential privacy or credential irrecoverableness requires
that there be a negligible probability of an attacker recovering
a valid credential from the interactions with a user. Again this
property can be deduced from the signature hiding property
of RSA-VES, defined as the third property of Definition 1 in
[21]. Signature hiding means that an attacker cannot extract a
signature from VES without help from the user who encrypted
the signature or the trusted authority who can decrypt a VES.
So, if this improved SSO scheme fails to meet credential
privacy, it implies that Ateniese’s RSA-VES fails to satisfy
signature hiding, which is contrary to the analysis given in
Section 3.7 of [21]. In fact, soundness and signature hiding
are the two core security properties to guarantee the fairness
of digital signature exchange using VES.
More rigorous security proofs are interesting topics for
further study by considering formal definitions first.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated two effective impersonation
attacks on Chang and Lee’s single sign-on (SSO) scheme [19].
The first attack shows that their scheme cannot protect the
privacy of a user’s credential, and thus, a malicious service
provider can impersonate a legal user in order to enjoy the re-
sources and services from other service providers. The second
attack violates the soundness of authentication by giving an
outside attacker without credential the chance to impersonate
even a non-existent user and then freely access resources and
services provided by service providers. We also discussed why
their well-organized security arguments are not strong enough
to guarantee the security of their SSO scheme. In addition,
we explained why Hsu and Chuang’s scheme [12] is also
vulnerable to these attacks. Furthermore, by employing an
efficient verifiable encryption of RSA signatures introduced by
Ateniese [21], we proposed an improved Chang-Lee scheme
to achieve soundness and credential privacy. As future work, it
is interesting to formally define authentication soundness and
construct efficient and provably secure single sign-on schemes.
Based on the draft of this work [36], a preliminary formal
model addressing the soundness of SSO has been proposed in
[37]. Further research is necessary to investigate the maturity
of this model and study how the security of the improved SSO
scheme proposed in this paper can be formally proven.
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